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Abstract
European nations substitute between employment protection regulations and labor mar-
ket expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance bene￿ts) for providing worker insurance.
Employment regulations more directly tax ￿rms making frequent labor adjustments than
other labor market insurance mechanisms. Venture capital investors are especially sensi-
tive to these labor adjustment costs. Nations favoring labor market expenditures as the
mechanism for providing worker insurance developed stronger venture capital markets over
1990-2008, especially in high volatility sectors. In this context, policy mechanisms are more
important than the overall level of worker insurance.
JEL Classi￿cation: G24, J21, J65, L26, M13, O31, O32, O52.
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11. Introduction
Policy makers and business leaders are continually seeking ways to foster innovation and eco-
nomic growth in their regions. A common refrain is that attracting venture capital (VC) investors
is an important early step. Both the European Union and OECD are urging member states to
promote the availability of risk capital ￿nancing for entrepreneurs, and multiple European gov-
ernments are investigating how to support VC and entrepreneurial ecosystems. These e⁄orts are
encouraged by more than just ￿ ashy case studies of Silicon Valley. These investors are linked to
better performance of portfolio companies and stronger aggregate innovation and growth.1
This paper investigates how labor market regulations across European countries in￿ uence
the development of VC investors. We focus speci￿cally on policy choices that provide labor
market insurance to workers. European countries di⁄er substantially in whether they emphasize
stronger employment protection versus greater unemployment insurance bene￿ts as techniques
for providing worker insurance. Our analysis examines the joint e⁄ects of these policies on the
types and strengths of VC investments made. We ￿nd evidence that strict labor regulations
hinder VC investment, especially in sectors with high labor volatility (e.g., computers).
Figure 1a illustrates the central policy trade-o⁄ that we evaluate by plotting labor market
expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance bene￿ts, worker re-training) against an index of
employment protection. First, Anglo-Saxon countries provide lower worker insurance on both
dimensions than Continental Europe. These di⁄erences in absolute levels of worker insurance
provided by nations have been a frequent political economy topic since at least de Tocqueville.
Second, the solid trend line, which is calculated only for Continental European nations and
excludes the Anglo-Saxon countries, indicates that economies with higher labor market expen-
1For example, Kortum and Lerner (2000), Samila and Sorenson (2011b), and Kerr et al. (2012).
1ditures have weaker employment protection. These mechanism di⁄erences have received less
attention, but the empirical policy substitution is clear (e.g., the Danish "￿ exicurity" approach).
The dashed trend line excludes Switzerland, whose policies more closely resemble Anglo-Saxon
economies, showing an even more pronounced substitution.
While employment protection and transition/re-entry assistance are perhaps substitutes for
providing worker security, they have di⁄erent implications for the costs ￿rms face. Employment
protection taxes the labor adjustment margins of ￿rms, and these adjustment costs can deter
VC investors given their attraction to growing, volatile sectors and given the business model
that VC investors employ. While labor market regulations do not speci￿cally target VC-backed
companies, these investors are seeking opportunities that are generally more sensitive to these
taxes on labor adjustment. Figures 1c and 1d show that policy choices are correlated with VC
placement (trend lines are still for Continental Europe). This study investigates these macro-
correlations more systematically through a country-sector panel analysis.
Our study makes three important contributions. Despite a large theoretical literature on
labor market policies, there are very few empirical studies that consider multiple labor insurance
mechanisms. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) provides the ￿rst and most comprehensive empirical
analysis of multiple labor policies in a study of the determinants of European unemployment,
but there has been little empirical work since then. Our ￿rst contribution builds upon Blan-
chard and Wolfers (2000) by designing statistical tests that take account of substitution across
di⁄erent mechanisms. We also develop simple transformations of the base policies to separate
the general level of labor market insurance provided to workers (aggregating over policies) and
the policy mechanisms used to implement the insurance. These methodologies help distinguish
and emphasize the roles and importance of labor insurance policy mechanisms.
2Second, recent theoretical models predict that countries with stricter labor policies will spe-
cialize in less-innovative activities due to the higher worker turnover frequently associated with
rapidly changing sectors. We use this prediction to provide greater empirical identi￿cation than
prior work. We analyze how policies impact 1) the cross-sectional distribution of sector-level
investments over countries similar to the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology, 2) an aggre-
gate longitudinal response within countries similar to Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), and 3) a
di⁄erential longitudinal response across sectors within a country that is akin to a di⁄erencing
of these methodologies. With respect to the ￿rst approach, we follow Klapper et al. (2006)
who use U.S. industry-level conditions to quantify the importance of entry barriers for entre-
preneurship across Europe in a Rajan and Zingales (1998) framework. Our paper is the ￿rst in
the entrepreneurial ￿nance literature to conduct this type of country-sector analysis for labor
market insurance policies. Our paper is also the ￿rst to undertake triple-di⁄erencing estimations
that push the Rajan and Zingales (1998) framework to also capture longitudinal changes.
Our ￿nal contribution is to document several new features on European VC investment and
portfolio companies. Most important, we provide the ￿rst systematic evidence on higher rates
of labor volatility among European ￿rms backed by VC investors compared to their peers. We
also show how VC selection di⁄ers by country-sector conditions as discussed further below.
A better understanding of these labor market insurance issues is essential for business man-
agers and policy makers. Despite a general desire to promote high-growth entrepreneurship,
there is substantial ambiguity about how to measure entrepreneurship and uncertainty about
which policy levers are best utilized. With respect to measurement, self-employment indices are
often utilized by academics and practitioners, and this metric might lead one to conclude that
employment protection increases entrepreneurship, as countries with stricter labor policies often
3have higher self-employment rates. Our work shifts the focus, however, to VC investments and
high-growth entrepreneurship where the opposite pattern is evident even in the raw data￿ e.g.,
southern European countries top self-employment scales but have smaller VC markets; the op-
posite is true for Scandinavia.2 Our study provides a more accurate empirical depiction of how
labor market policies in￿ uence innovation and high-growth entrepreneurship than previously
available. Establishing these facts is key for investment and ￿rm location decisions (e.g., Alcacer
and Chung 2007), cluster formation (e.g., Delgado et al. 2010a,b, Glaeser et al. 2012), and
appropriate policy design.
Related to the uncertainty about which policy levers to utilize, many countries attempt active
policy interventions, like public venturing, to promote entrepreneurship (Leleux and Surlemont
2003). Yet many of these active e⁄orts are unsuccessful (e.g., Lerner 2009). Our work instead
highlights the strong in￿ uence of passive policies like general labor regulations.3 Moreover, the
sector-level specialization that we document is very important for VC placement decisions given
the cluster and agglomeration economics typical of this sector. Public venturing is unlikely to
be successful, for either the policy maker or business manager induced to enter, if the underlying
policy environment is inappropriate. Interventions often target volatile sectors (e.g., energy,
computers, biotech), yet our sector-level placement work shows that VC investments for these
sectors are most in￿ uenced by the mechanism choice.
Finally, this study contributes to work on how labor market regulations in￿ uence industrial
structure and productivity growth. Many observers believe strict European labor policies hinder
2De￿nitions of entrepreneurship matter a lot in this context, with self-employment often re￿ ecting poor
opportunities (e.g., Glaeser and Kerr 2009, Schoar 2009, and ¯stebro et al. 2011). Parker (2009) provides
a comprehensive review of the literature on entrepreneurship.
3This complements studies of non-compete clauses that are far more prevalent (e.g., Gilson 1999, Hyde 2003,
Stuart and Sorenson 2003, Fallick et al. 2005, Armour and Cumming 2006, Franco and Mitchell 2008, Marx et
al. 2009a,b, Samila and Sorenson 2011a,b). Ardagna and Lusardi (2009) provide a broader scope on regulations.
4economic growth, perhaps by redirecting or slowing down innovation and start-up entry, reducing
the speed at which scarce resources are reallocated towards more productive opportunities, and
similar. A recent Economist article, for example, cited labor regulations as one of the three
big factors holding European entrepreneurship back, along with bankruptcy provisions/fear of
failure and access to ￿nance.4 Our study of VC investments provides an input into understanding
these questions with particular attention placed on the di⁄erences that emerge across European
sectors in response to policy frameworks and managerial choices.
2. Theoretical Background and Empirical Approach
Employment Protection and Labor Volatility
A vast theoretical literature considers the economic e⁄ects of employment protection. These
models di⁄er sharply with respect to how employment protection in￿ uences total employment
levels, technical e¢ ciency, and many other economic outcomes. Our study, however, focuses on
one economic outcome where the models share a common ￿nding￿ that employment protection
should dampen labor ￿ uctuations by ￿rms when binding. If not binding, perhaps because the
value that workers place on employment protection exactly o⁄sets costs to ￿rms, then no changes
in labor ￿ uctuations should be observed. Otherwise, employment protection results in labor
adjustment costs to ￿rms that reduce job separations. Moreover, if ￿rms are forward-looking
and anticipate these separation costs, they reduce their hiring rates as well. While the net e⁄ect
of this reduced hiring and ￿ring is ambiguous for many outcomes like ￿rm productivity, overall
employment volatility unambiguously declines.5
4"Les misØrables", Brie￿ng on European Entrepreneurs, 28 July 2012, 19-22.
5Empirical evidence, while small, supports this prediction of dampened ￿rm volatility due to stricter employ-
ment protection (e.g., Blanchard and Portugal 2001, Autor et al. 2007, Lafontaine and Sivadasan 2009, and
Wolfers 2010). Addison and Teixeira (2003) provide a more comprehensive review.
5This labor adjustment cost feature of employment protection contrasts sharply with labor
market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance bene￿ts) that also provide worker insurance
but do not tax separations directly. Thus, ￿rms have greater ￿ exibility in their hiring and
￿ring if worker insurance is provided through labor market expenditures. General taxation may
need to be higher to support labor market expenditures, but this taxation is shared throughout
the economy, rather than concentrated on one margin.6 Thus, ￿rms and industries with high
inherent labor volatility are disadvantaged, all else being equal, when labor market insurance is
provided to workers via employment protection rather than through labor market expenditures.
Despite the theoretical work examining each policy separately, we are just beginning to model
and evaluate their optimal design jointly. Optimal design may involve both policies to a degree,
and there are many factors beyond our study￿ s scope. We hope to provide empirical evidence
from VC placements that informs this important policy trade-o⁄.7
Venture Capital Investments
Young entrepreneurial ￿rms often struggle with ￿nancing the pursuit of their innovations or
business concepts (e.g., Cabral and Mata 2004). These start-ups have few tangible assets that
can be pledged for a bank loan, and traditional ￿nancial institutions typically lack the expertise
to assess the creditworthiness of proposed ventures, especially in emerging sectors. VC investors
have emerged as an e⁄ective model for ￿nancing and supporting these innovative, high-growth
opportunities.
There are two general ways in which strict employment protection impacts VC investors.
6Experience Rating systems link unemployment insurance contributions to dismissal histories (a partial inci-
dence weaker than employment protection). This system is employed by the US but otherwise fairly rare.
7Examples of joint policy models are Pissarides (2001), Blanchard and Tirole (2007), Br￿gemann (2007), and
Boeri et al. (2010). Alesina et al. (2001) and Kerr (2011) further discuss the higher general worker insurance
levels provided by Continental European countries compared to Anglo-Saxon economies.
6First, employment protection hinders the overall development of the high-growth sectors in
which VCs specialize, due to its tax on worker dismissals. This market size e⁄ect is particularly
acute in high-volatility industries that are often associated with technical change. This sector-
level prediction is more subtle than the general prediction of declining employment ￿ uctuations
noted above for the whole economy.8 VC investors are very sensitive to this weakening of high-
growth, volatile industries. Growing sectors aid the rapid development of portfolio companies.
Moreover, many screening, monitoring, and reputation features of the value-added VC model
are most bene￿cial in these settings of incomplete information and uncertainty (e.g., Hsu 2004).
VC-backed ￿rms are linked with the emergence of new technology-based industries, and strong
employment protection can substantially reduce the general attractiveness of these industries.
Second, labor adjustment costs weaken the speci￿c business models of VC investors over-and-
above market size e⁄ects. This can lower VC returns and lead them to decline otherwise fundable
deals. Flexibility is central to the VC business model. Characteristic of entrepreneurial and
innovative endeavors, most VC-backed companies fail despite the assistance. Successful investors
maintain a portfolio of projects and reallocate resources aggressively from failing ventures to high-
performing investments.9 This staged approach yields option values for investments, and VC
investors close under-performing ventures for the sake of better opportunities. Strict employment
protection increases the costs of these labor adjustments and closures, weakening the VC model.
Despite these theoretical linkages, our empirical understanding of how labor regulations shape
8For example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Saint-Paul (1997, 2002), Samaniego (2006), Bartelsman and
Hinloopen (2006), Cuæat and Melitz (2010), Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009), and Algan and Cahuc (2009). This
complements a larger literature on choices to be entrepreneurs like Khilstrom and La⁄ont (1979), Lazear (2005),
Simons and ¯stebro (2010), Parker and Van Praag (2011), and Chen (2012).
9Over half of VC investments yield zero or negative returns, with a small number of great successes generating
most of the pro￿ts. For example, Sahlman (1990), Gompers and Lerner (2002), Kaplan and Str￿mberg (2003),
Cochrane (2005), Gompers et al. (2009), Bengtsson (2011), and Da Rin et al. (2012). Puri and Zarutskie (2011)
and Chemmanur et al. (2011) provide related evidence on the labor volatility of VC-backed ￿rms in the US.
7VC investment is underdeveloped, especially at the sector level.10;11
Empirical Approach
Our analysis centers on di⁄erences across industries in their inherent labor volatilities. Measur-
ing the inherent labor volatilities￿ as opposed to the realized labor volatilities by country and
sector￿ is important given that labor market policies directly in￿ uence realized employment
￿ ows. Consider a sector with inherent labor volatility v ￿ 0 in a country with employment
protection levels EPR ￿ 0. The sector is su¢ ciently small and open such that it takes prices
and policies as exogenously determined.
A continuum of entrepreneurial opportunities in the sector of unit mass are ordered by
their quality qi, which is distributed uniformly from zero to ￿ q. A risk neutral entrepreneur
with a project quality qi decides to enter the market or not by examining the pro￿tability
(1￿t)[￿(qi)￿c(v;EPR)]￿FC: In this expression, t is the corporate tax rate, ￿(qi) is the natural
pro￿t for a given project quality, and c(v;EPR) is an additional cost due to labor volatility and
employment protection. FC ￿ 0 is a ￿xed cost of entry that we assume cannot o⁄set pro￿ts.
Pro￿ts are increasing in project quality: ￿(0) = 0 and @￿=@q > 0 (e.g., ￿ = ￿ ￿ q, ￿ > 0).
Higher volatility and employment protection generate higher costs: c(0;EPR) = c(v;0) = 0,
@c=@v > 0, @c=@EPR > 0, and @2c=@v@EPR > 0 (e.g., c = ￿ ￿ v ￿ EPR, ￿ > 0).
10Related empirical studies include Jeng and Wells (2000), Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001), Parker and
Robson (2004), Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2004), Kanniainen and Vesala (2005), Mayer et al. (2005), Da
Rin et al. (2006), Armour and Cumming (2006), Micco and PagØs (2007), Cumming and Johan (2009), and
Cuæat and Melitz (2010). Cumming (2013) strongly debates the Da Rin et al. (2006) methodology and results.
11As background for this project, we undertook semi-structured interviews of practitioners in ten European
countries. Across respondent countries, investment managers generally believed labor regulations to be an im-
portant factor in local VC development, although several noted that they were willing to enter heavily regulated
markets if other advantages existed like high quality labor. Two sample interview quotes are: ￿We want our early
stage investments to grow quickly to 50-100 employees, but they may also need to fall back to 25 workers. Strict
employment regulations make it less attractive for starting these risky businesses.￿ Also, "National di⁄erences
in labor regulations are an important factor for where pan-European funds place their resources.￿
8Entrepreneurs enter if their qualities equal or exceed a lower threshold qmin de￿ned by
(1 ￿ t)[￿(qmin) ￿ c(v;EPR)] ￿ FC = ￿ u, where ￿ u is a reservation utility, or q ￿ qmin =
￿￿1 [(￿ u + FC)=(1 ￿ t) + c(v;EPR)]: Thus, the size of the sector in terms of the number of
￿rms can be represented as (￿ q ￿ qmin)=￿ q > 0. Sector size increases with a lower tax rate, lower
employment protection, lower volatility, and lower ￿xed costs. Allow for two sectors that are
identical, except sector 1 is more volatile than sector 2: v1 > v2. Sector 2 is larger than sector
1 (q1
min > q2
min). Taking the simple case of a linear pro￿t function ￿ = ￿ ￿ q, di⁄erences in sector
size grow with greater employment protection due to the incidence it has on labor adjustments,
while changes in corporate taxes a⁄ect sectors equally due to their general incidence.12
This set-up is very simple but captures several key empirical issues. First, let the level of
worker insurance provided in the country be I(EPR;LME) = ￿EPREPR+￿LMELME, where
LME ￿ 0 is labor market expenditures. This I(￿) function assumes policies are additive and
separable, and ￿EPR, ￿LME > 0 weight each policy￿ s importance for worker insurance. Labor
market expenditures are paid for by corporate taxes, such that @t=@LME > 0. If a policy maker
seeks to maintain a level of insurance ￿ I but to move from a regime emphasizing employment
protection to one emphasizing greater labor market expenditures, the required adjustment is
￿LME = ￿￿EPR ￿ (￿EPR=￿LME). Thus, higher corporate taxes are necessary to maintain
a given insurance level as employment protection declines, and the relative size of the volatile
sector to the less volatile sector increases in our simple linear case.13
12Technically, @(q1
min ￿ q2
min)=@EPR > 0; @2qmin=@v@EPR > 0; @(q1
min ￿ q2
min)=@t = 0; @2qmin=@v@t = 0.
Adding curvature to the pro￿t function yields sector growth di⁄erences with respect to marginal tax rate changes,
but the spirit of our predictions with respect to labor volatility continues to hold.
13Technically, @2qmin=@v@EPR > 0, @qmin=@v@t = 0. Whether or not sectors generally increase or decline
requires further model structure (@qmin=@EPR > 0, @qmin=@t > 0• ). The most likely scenario, and one for
which we derive empirical support below, is that all sectors generally grow with the policy shifts away from
employment protection. For simplicity, this framework does not model channels through which labor market
insurance levels bene￿t sector size. Whether or not a higher overall level of labor market insurance improves
9Second, consider the empirical challenge of measuring sector volatility. Our starting assump-
tion of constant volatility by sector does not hold under realistic scenarios where labor volatility
varies across ￿rms. Instead, a more appropriate metric is the inherent volatility of a sector
across the full support [0; ￿ q].14 Allowing volatility to vary continuously with quality v(q), a nat-
ural assumption for our entrepreneurial setting is that higher quality opportunities have greater
volatility as ￿rms strive to obtain scale: @v=@q > 0. In this case, qmin is implicitly de￿ned by
(1￿t)[￿(qmin)￿c(v(qmin);EPR)]￿FC = ￿ u. Empirically, one would measure the average volatil-
ity of a given country and sector as vol = ((￿ q ￿ qmin)=￿ q)￿1 R ￿ q
qmin v(i)di. As qmin is a function of
EPR, measured volatility depends upon policy choices. Moreover, this selection margin worsens
with stricter regulations and in more naturally volatile sectors, compounding concerns.15
Instead, the best setting to measure labor volatility and di⁄erences across sectors is where the
distortions are weakest and the fullest distribution of entrants and ￿rms is observed. Accordingly,
our primary measures are developed using the volatilities of plants and ￿rms in the US. US
policies are the least distortionary, and we have a full census of ￿rms spanning 1977-1999. In a
hypothetical sector with no inherent labor volatility, we would not expect signi￿cant di⁄erences
in VC formation across European countries due to their labor market policy choices. By contrast,
US sectors with high labor volatility should exhibit substantive di⁄erences.16
or reduces investment levels di⁄erentially in volatile sectors is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, generous
insurance may reduce entrepreneurial incentives, potentially with industrial organization implications (e.g., the
rapid mobility in the model of Fallick et al. 2006). Alternatively, a generous safety net may reduce worker
insecurity and/or compensation di⁄erentials associated with job loss, e⁄ectively subsidizing volatile sectors.
14In practice, the lower bound of zero is unrealistic as it requires reservation utilities, ￿xed costs, and corporate
taxes to all be zero, in addition to labor policies being non-distortionary. One might instead suggest the true
measure to be [qLB; ￿ q], where the lower bound qLB is de￿ned by the lowest possible values of the above three
factors.
15The general point is that observed labor volatilities for a country-sector are strongly in￿ uenced by selection
margins and thus incomplete. These issues extend, albeit much more weakly, to di⁄erences in taxes, ￿xed costs,
and reservation utilities. Related factors outside of our simple model are business model adjustments by ￿rms
and incomplete distributions of project ideas for small countries and sectors.
16The higher sensitivity of VC investors to labor policies can be easily incorporated by having these investors
103. Primary Data Sources and Variable Construction
Labor Market Insurance Policies
We use this empirical framework to systematically link labor policies and VC investment levels
across countries and industries in Europe. Tables 1A and 1B describe our 1990-2008 data. The
start and end dates of our analysis are dictated by data availability constraints. Our VC data
have sparse coverage prior to 1990, when European VC investments were very small. After 2008,
we have substantial attrition in the availability of our labor market policy variables and related
covariates. Moreover, adjustments in sector de￿nitions by data providers make longer panels
more di¢ cult to construct. Our 19-year panel provides the best balance across these issues.
In Column 1 of Table 1A, the OECD employment protection index has a theoretical range
from zero to ￿ve, with higher scores indicating more heavily regulated labor markets. The index
factors in a wide variety of legislation concerning the individual and collective dismissals of both
temporary and regular workers. The rating includes the di¢ culty of worker dismissals (e.g., to
justify as "fair"), the required procedural steps, and mandated severance pay and notice periods.
Its primary limitations are for capturing judicial procedures or voluntary contractual provisions.
Table 1a gives the average value of this annual rating by country. Switzerland (1.1), Denmark
(1.7), Portugal (3.7), and Spain (3.1) are extreme values within Continental Europe. The UK
and Ireland sit between the US (0.2) and Continental Europe.
Labor market expenditures are also taken from the OECD. Unemployment insurance bene￿ts
are the majority of expenditures, with examples of other included active labor market programs
raise the volatility of their portfolio ￿rms by a constant " > 1. As a bene￿t, VC investors can lower the ￿xed
costs of entry, perhaps due to scarce industry expertise or ￿nancial constraints, or increase the pro￿t function.
In this framework, @qV C
min=@EPR > @qmin=@EPR and @2qV C
min=@v@EPR > @2qmin=@v@EPR, where qV C
min is the
minimum VC threshold.
11being labor market training, school-to-work transition assistance for youth, and programs to
help the unemployed obtain jobs. Denmark provides the highest average share from 1990-2008
at 4.8% (approximately 1482 ECUs/Euros per capita at sample mid-point), followed by Finland,
Belgium, and Sweden. The UK provides the lowest expenditures at 0.9% (173 ECUs/Euros per
capita), followed by Italy, Switzerland, and Portugal. The 0.5% average for the US is again lower
than any nation within Europe.
In addition to base policies, we also consider simple transformations to present these di⁄er-
ences in the most intuitive manner. We ￿rst transform the base policies to have unit standard
deviations so that their scales are comparable. We then measure the single-dimension distance
for each policy from the lowest provision of that policy in the OECD. These distances have a
maximum of less than four standard deviations. Our Levels Index is the average of these policy
distances for each observation; it estimates in standard deviations the distance from a country￿ s
joint provision of (employment protection, labor market expenditures) to the OECD minimums.
Column 3 and the vertical axis of Figure 1b plot the average Levels Index by country across
our time period. The UK and Switzerland provide the lowest insurance on average, while nine
nations have average values above 3.4.
Second, the Mechanism Index describes the technique used to provision labor market insur-
ance. It is a radian measure of the labor market expenditures distance divided by the employment
protection distance. The Mechanism Index can be thought of as the slope of a ray extending
from the origin of Figure 1a to the nation￿ s position in (employment protection, labor market
expenditures) space. Larger values of the Mechanism Index indicate greater reliance on labor
market expenditures. Portugal and Italy have the lowest average values, while Denmark and Ire-
land most emphasize labor market expenditures. These values are the horizontal axis of Figure
121b, and the ￿ at trend line for Continental Europe illustrates the policy substitution.
Table 1A provides the average values of the labor market policies, and Appendix Table 1
documents the full time series of our base policies and transformed insurance metrics. Across
our time frame, most countries have constant employment protection or gradually move towards
more ￿ exibility. The simple average across countries declines from 2.6 in 1990-1994 to 2.1 in
2005-2008. The average labor market expenditure as a share of GDP also declines during our
sample period, from 3.0 in 1990-1994 to 2.0 in 2005-2008. In terms of our transformed indices,
the average Levels Index declines from 3.4 in 1990-1994 to 2.9 in 2005-2008. This average decline
is due to weaker provision of both underlying policies. By contrast, the Mechanism Index does
not show an average trend as both policies are declining together.
Our analysis exploits multiple tests of the link between labor policies and VC investment.
Some frameworks utilize cross-sectional variation, while others utilize panel variation. To quan-
tify the degree of variation exploited in each test, we conduct a within-between decomposition of
variance. The within-country variations account for 13% and 20% of the total variations in our
sample for employment protection and labor market expenditures, respectively; the between-
country variation is the residual. Thus, countries￿long-term positions represent a substantial
share of the di⁄erences that exist. This stability in large part relates to the aggregate insurance
levels countries select. With our index transformations, the within-country variations account
for 43% and 15% of the total variations in our sample for the Mechanism Index and Levels Index,
respectively. Thus, our transformations help isolate a more active policy dimension. We observe
below that our key ￿ndings are evident using both within and between variation.
VC Investment Data and Sector Volatility Measures
13Column 5 introduces simple counts of VC deals from Thomson￿ s Venture Xpert database
for 1990-2008. The Thomson data are the backbone of our primary estimations, and we dis-
cuss below European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) data used in
robustness checks. Reassuringly, there is a close correspondence of aggregates between these two
data sources. VC investment levels have been largest in absolute size in the UK, France, and
Germany; relative to GDP, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark stand out.
Column 1 of Table 1B considers the sector perspective using EVCA sectors ordered by in-
vestment levels. Computers and Communications are the largest. Appendix Table 2 provides
more details on sector de￿nitions. One important trait of the EVCA classi￿cation system is that
the Computer and Communications categories focus on hardware and software development
particular to those sectors. Thus, as an example, VC support for a start-up in on-line banking
would fall under Financial services. Our empirical analysis considers cross-sectional and longitu-
dinal variation in these placements. Appendix Table 3 shows that the sector distribution across
countries is su¢ cient to support these exercises.17
Column 2 of Table 1B introduces measures of US labor volatility by sector. Our cen-
tral metrics are calculated from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bu-
reau over 1977-1999 at the establishment level. Over 80% of US establishments have 20 or
fewer employees (Kerr and Nanda 2009). We calculate volatility across a long period to iso-
17Thomson￿ s deal-level records allow us to separate VC activity from other private equity investment, which is
unfortunately not possible at the sector level with the EVCA data. A second advantage of deal-level records is
that we can consistently construct sectors over 1990-2008 by aggregating individual technologies, whereas EVCA
sector de￿nitions change in 2004. A liability of Thomson, however, is that investment amounts are not reported
for about half of the deals. For this reason, we mostly focus on the count of deals by country-sector. When
analyzing values we impute missing values by ￿rst regressing reported amounts on vectors of ￿xed e⁄ects for
countries, sectors, years, and number of investors. We then predict deal values for missing observations using the
estimated parameters subject to predicted values being above sector minimums. Thomson￿ s coverage of deals
increases during the sample period. Uniform changes by sector or country do not in￿ uence our results due to our
￿xed e⁄ect estimation approach, but coverage changes speci￿c to a country-sector could bias our estimations.
We have not identi￿ed such country-sector changes in collection procedures.
14late volatility estimates from particular business cycle conditions or industry life cycle stages.
Following Davis et al. (1996), we calculate the employment volatility of establishment e as
ABSe;t = jEe;t ￿ Ee;t￿1j=[(Ee;t + Ee;t￿1)=2]. This formula divides the absolute change in em-
ployment by its average across the two years. This measure is bounded by [0;2], prevents outliers,
and symmetrically treats positive and negative shifts. This is important as labor adjustment
costs can a⁄ect hiring decisions just as much as dismissals.
The establishment-level nature of this calculation is also important. First, from a theoretical
perspective, micro-founded models of this type of phenomena like Samaniego (2006) embed this
issue at the establishment or plant level (e.g., technological obsolescence of a facility), and many
employment decisions are made within local units. Second, establishment-level employment
￿ uctuations are more likely to resemble the typical experiences of VC ￿rms. We also prefer
establishment-level calculations to allow more accurate sector assignments and the entry and
exit of plants that theoretical models emphasize (in addition to greater volatility). Nonetheless,
we demonstrate below comparable results when calculating ABS at the sector level.
After calculating ABS at the establishment-year level, we take the mean across establish-
ments within each sector across the full 1977-1999 period. We de￿ne sectors through two rep-
resentative three-digit SIC industries where investments are likely to occur. Concordances are
available from the authors upon request. We use this single time-invariant measure for each
sector in our country-sector panel analysis. The Computer (0.52) and Energy (0.49) sectors
have the greatest turnover, while Chemicals and materials (0.28) and Industrial products and
services (0.31) have the lowest.
Table 2 provides simple tabulations to further describe our data and motivate our analysis
of labor market policies. We start by grouping sectors into three bins according to their US
15labor volatility. Column 1 provides the average distribution of investments across the bins for
Europe as a whole, and the notes to Table 2 list speci￿c sectors by bin. In Columns 2-4, we use
the Mechanism Index of labor market insurance to split countries into two groups based upon
whether or not they tend to use employment protection more than labor market expenditures for
providing a chosen level of insurance. Table 2￿ s notes again list speci￿c countries in each group.
Column 4 compares the distributions, ￿nding that countries favoring labor market expenditures
over employment protection have a greater share of their investments in the high-volatility sectors
and a reduced share in medium-volatility sectors. This pattern is not evident, by contrast, in
Columns 5-7 where we split countries according to the Levels Index. This initial tabulation
suggests policies are important, and our analysis below quanti￿es these di⁄erences in more
rigorous estimation frameworks.
Amadeus Database
Our ￿nal data source is Bureau van Dijk￿ s Amadeus database of several million public and
private European companies. These company records constitute an unbalanced panel of op-
erating entities. In addition to annual operating data like employment and sales, Amadeus
contains information on ￿rm ownership structures that includes whether or not a ￿rm￿ s owner
is a private equity investor. We focus on Amadeus data during the 1999-2008 period when
coverage is most complete. We combine Amadeus with Thomson￿ s deal-level records using auto-
mated name-matching routines followed by manual veri￿cation and extensions. We ￿rst match
portfolio companies in Thomson to operating ￿rms in Amadeus, and we also match VC ￿rms in
Thomson to ￿rm ownership structures. Over 70% of Amadeus￿private equity owners are present
in Thomson, and we use this match to isolate VC investors. The resulting dataset is a platform
16for examining VC selection and employment volatilities in the next section. We also estimate
through Amadeus several country-sector traits described below that serve as controls.18
4. Labor Volatility and Selection of VC-Backed Firms
Table 3 quanti￿es the higher labor volatility of VC-backed ￿rms in Europe compared to their
peers through the matched Amadeus database. We measure labor volatility using the same
ABS formula that we use with the US data with two modi￿cations: we are limited to ￿rm-level
￿ uctuations, rather than establishments, and we abstract from entry and exit since we do not
observe the universe of ￿rms. The mean values of ABS within Amadeus are 0.232 for ￿rms
backed by VCs and 0.156 for ￿rms generally. This di⁄erence is substantial, accounting for 42%
of the interquartile range of employment volatility. The interquartile range of ABS for VC-
backed companies is also 37% larger than the interquartile range for the full sample, re￿ ecting
greater variability. For regressions, we transform ABS to have unit standard deviation to aid
interpretation. As the ownership data do not vary longitudinally for ￿rms, we prepare a ￿xed
indicator variable for VC ownership. The notes for each table provide additional details.
Column 1 simply regresses the ABS metric on a constant and the VC indicator. The em-
ployment volatility of VC-backed ￿rms is 0.29 standard deviations higher than typical ￿rms.
Columns 2 and 3 show that this di⁄erence is not due to VC-backed ￿rms being in more volatile
sectors or at a di⁄erent point in their life cycle. The premium declines only slightly after con-
trolling for country-industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects and the ￿rm￿ s contemporaneous employment and
18Data constraints on the ownership records limit Tables 3 and 4 to Amadeus records reported in the "medium
and large" databases. Bureau van Dijk de￿nes medium and large through the median ￿rm size at the industry
level across countries. This threshold value is quite small (median of one, mean of four workers). Results available
from the authors demonstrate robustness to this selection in many ways. We con￿rm VC investment in 0.14%
of the sample. This share may overstate true activity should Amadeus be more likely to include VC-backed
companies. On the other hand, this share may understate activity as we are unable to determine type of private
equity investor in many cases. Reported results consider cases where VC backing is con￿rmed, and additional
analyses establish robustness to alternative approaches of assigning unidenti￿ed investors.
17revenues. Columns 4 and 5 show that the employment volatility premium persists after restrict-
ing the sample to country-industry pairs where VC investment is common (de￿ned as more than
1% of ￿rms). This bar excludes over 95% of the sample but further conforms treatment and
control groups. Likewise, Column 6 ￿nds a similar premium when taking a third approach of
creating a control group that most closely matches the employment and revenues of the VC-
backed ￿rms within the same country-industry-year. VC-backed ￿rms are systematically more
volatile than their European peers.
Table 4 quanti￿es how selection and traits of VC-backed companies di⁄er with employment
protection and sector volatility. Coe¢ cients come from a single regression of an indicator vari-
able for VC backing on six traits of ventures￿ employment, revenues, assets per employee, ￿rm
age, wage, and EBITDA margins￿ and their interactions with US sector volatility, employment
protection in the country, and their joint interaction. The ￿rst row shows that VC-backed ven-
tures tend to be larger in terms of employment, more capital intensive, younger, and employ
higher-wage workers than other ￿rms in the country-industry-year. Conditional on other traits,
VC-backed ventures also have lower revenues and earnings. These patterns are modestly ac-
centuated in high volatility sectors. The third and fourth rows consider employment protection
levels and their interactions with sector volatility. Stronger employment protection is associated
with a partial diminishing of traits typically associated with VC investment. This pattern, more-
over, is especially pronounced in volatile sectors where investments shift towards smaller and
older businesses that have more revenues and better EBITDA margins. Stricter labor regulations
appear associated with safer investments, especially in high volatility sectors.19
19As noted in the prior section, we match the Thomson and Amadeus databases at both the operating company
and ￿rm owner levels. The reported speci￿cations are conservative in that we only include exactly matched cases
on both dimensions. Given the very large size of the non-VC-backed sample, we obtain very similar results with
185. VC Placements in Europe
Primary Speci￿cations
Tables 5-7 quantify the country-sector formation of VC investments. We consider both cross-
sectional dimensions and longitudinal changes across four periods: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-
2004, and 2005-2008. We have 840 observations from 15 countries, 14 sectors, and four periods.
Even with ￿ve-year periods, some country-sector-period observations have no investments. We
thus ￿rst consider the extensive margin through a (0,1) indicator variable for one or more VC
investments on average per year in the country-sector-period. We then consider the intensive
margin through log investment counts and amounts. The latter speci￿cations include 671 ob-
servations with positive investment levels.
Table 5 provides cross-sectional estimations similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998), Carlin and
Mayer (2003), and Klapper et al. (2006). These estimations take the form,
V Cc;s;t = ￿c;t + ￿s;t + ￿EPREPRc;t ￿ LaborV ol
US
s + ￿LMELMEc;t ￿ LaborV ol
US
s + "c;s;t;
where c indexes countries and s indexes sectors. The ￿rst explanatory variable in Columns 1-3
of Panel A is the country￿ s OECD employment protection index interacted with time-invariant
US sector volatility. The second is a similar interaction of US sector volatility with labor market
expenditures as a share of GDP. These speci￿cations include sector-period ￿xed e⁄ects (FEs)
￿s;t and country-period FEs ￿c;t that account for aggregate growth in sector and country VC
investment over time. These FEs also absorb the main e⁄ects of the labor policies and sector
volatilities. Identi￿cation comes from cross-sectional variation in sector size across countries,
other strategies like retaining all partial or suspected matches.
19testing the prediction that stricter labor policies should particularly hinder development of VC
investments in more volatile sectors.
The ￿rst row ￿nds broad evidence that higher employment protection is associated with lower
VC investment in volatile sectors, while the second row shows the opposite pattern with labor
market expenditures. Our model describes how policy adjustments along a given insurance
frontier require changes of ￿LME = ￿￿EPR ￿ (￿EPR=￿LME) to maintain a ￿xed insurance
level. Using our regression results, the impact of such an adjustment on VC investment is
￿V C = ￿LME￿LME + ￿EPR￿EPR = ￿LME ￿ ￿EPR ￿ (￿LME=￿EPR). The last row of Panel
A presents this comparative static with I(￿) de￿ned by ￿LME = ￿EPR. This equal contribution
of employment protection and labor market expenditures is motivated by Figure 1a￿ s policy
trade-o⁄ within Continental Europe. The linear combinations of ￿LME ￿ ￿EPR are more stable
and well-measured than the individual policies are.
Panel B instead considers as explanatory variables the interactions of the Levels and Mech-
anism Indices with US labor volatilities by sector. These estimations highlight the importance
of the mechanisms used to provision insurance, with a shift towards more ￿ exible policies asso-
ciated with stronger VC development in volatile sectors. The stability of the Mechanism Index
interaction mirrors that of the linear policy combination at the bottom of Panel A.
Columns 4-6 include controls of country-sector employment levels and mean wages, country-
sector-period patenting, lagged share of past country-sector-period VC investments achieving
initial public o⁄erings, and share of VC investments by country-sector-period in seed and early
stages. Unmodeled factors that vary by country-period or sector-period are captured by the
FEs. These controls proxy imperfectly for potentially confounding aspects by country-sector
like di⁄erences in life cycles, technology opportunities, past investor returns, and similar factors
20that in￿ uence demand for VC. As many of these outcomes can be endogenous to the link between
labor policies and VC investment, showing stability with and without the controls is important.20
Section 2 described how labor market policies can have both market size e⁄ects that encourage
or deter VC investments, with VC remaining a constant share of the country-sector activity, and
business-model e⁄ects that deter VC investments in particular. We can make a rough estimate
of these features by excluding our market size control. Doing so, we estimate coe¢ cients for
the Mechanism Index of 0.030 (0.008) and 0.107 (0.042) in the entry and log count regressions,
respectively. Comparing these coe¢ cients to those in Table 5 suggests that market size e⁄ects
are about 7% of the total on the entry margin, and they are about 23% on the intensive margin.
Because we are not able to consistently measure the general size of country-sectors across the
whole sample period, we cannot distinguish these features in the upcoming longitudinal analyses.
Thus, these panel estimates combine the two e⁄ects.
Table 6 provides longitudinal estimations that include country-sector FEs ￿c;s and sector-
period FEs ￿s;t. These estimations take the form,
V Cc;s;t = ￿c;s + ￿s;t + ￿EPREPRc;t + ￿EPREPRc;t ￿ LaborV ol
US
s
+￿LMELMEc;t + ￿LMELMEc;t ￿ LaborV ol
US
s + "c;s;t:
20We measure employment and wages from Amadeus; patenting from the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) and
US Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) datasets; IPO activity for our Thomson sample from Capital IQ,
SDC, and manual searches; and seed and early stage VC shares from Thomson. The EPO and USPTO datasets
have their own technology classi￿cations that we map to EVCA sectors.
In our data, wages are negatively correlated with employment protection levels. In the standard competitive
model of the labor market, employment protections are economically equivalent to mandated employment ben-
e￿ts. Bene￿t mandates raise the cost of employing workers, leading to a decline in labor demand by ￿rms for a
given wage rate. To the extent that workers value the mandate, they will increase their labor supply at a given
wage. If workers value the mandated bene￿t at its marginal cost of provision, then equilibrium employment levels
are unchanged and wages fall to cover exactly the cost of the bene￿t. In this scenario, the mandate is e¢ cient
and the Coase theorem applies (e.g., Summers 1989, Lazear 1990). Autor et al. (2007) review wage adjustments
in scenarios when the mandate is not e¢ cient.
21Country-sector FEs remove cross-sectional di⁄erences across country-sectors in labor policies,
VC investment levels, and similar. Sector-period FEs control for overall European VC growth
by sector. As we do not model country-period FEs, we estimate the main e⁄ects of the two
labor policies (￿EPR, ￿LME) in addition to their interactions. Main e⁄ects capture longitudinal
responses that are common to all sectors within a country; the interactions capture the di⁄eren-
tial in longitudinal response across sectors due to their labor volatility. We include a log GDP
control in these estimations, and Columns 4-6 again consider additional controls.
Panel A shows that the main e⁄ects of the two policies and their volatility interactions are
in the predicted direction, although some coe¢ cients are not precisely measured. The linear
combination of e⁄ects at the bottom of Panel A ￿nds strong e⁄ects for the comparative static
of reducing employment protection while increasing labor market expenditures. Panel B shows
this even more cleanly when using the Levels and Mechanism Indices and their interactions.
The main e⁄ects for the Mechanism Index suggest that shifts in policies towards more ￿ exible
markets are associated with an increase in VC entry and investment counts across all sectors.
The interaction e⁄ect further suggests that this increase is particularly strong in more volatile
sectors. By contrast, there are no clear ￿ndings for the Levels Index.
Table 7 adds country-period FEs ￿c;t to the longitudinal speci￿cation in a triple-di⁄erence.
These estimations take the form,
V Cc;s;t = ￿c;s + ￿c;t + ￿s;t + ￿EPREPRc;t ￿ LaborV ol
US
s + ￿LMELMEc;t ￿ LaborV ol
US
s + "c;s;t:
The speci￿cation requires that within-country shifts in worker insurance policies towards more
￿ exible techniques connect with increases in VC ￿nancing (the ￿rst di⁄erencing due to the
22country-sector FEs ￿c;s, a longitudinal response) that exceed the overall sector growth for Europe
(the second di⁄erencing due to sector-period FEs ￿s;t) and that are strongest in sectors with
greater intrinsic labor volatility (the third di⁄erencing due to country-period FEs ￿c;t). As a
consequence, we no longer estimate main e⁄ects. The interaction patterns persist: VC growth
is particularly strong in volatile sectors when countries are shifting towards more ￿ exible labor
policies. It is very important for these results to recall that sector volatility is time-invariant
and measured using US data, so that changes are only being identi￿ed through policies.21
Robustness Checks
Tables 8 and 9 report robustness checks on the entry and count speci￿cations using Table 6￿ s
longitudinal speci￿cation that allows main e⁄ects and interactions.22 Across the many robustness
checks considered, we select these to highlight strengths and limitations to our results. Column
1 of Table 8 ￿nds comparable results using US sector-level volatility from 1992-1999. In general,
our results are quite robust to di⁄erent volatility metrics and to including additional interactions
of sector growth rates and labor policies, indicating higher volatility is not proxying for growth.
Our main regressions are weighted by an interaction of aggregate country size with aggre-
gate sector size. We place more faith in weighted estimations than unweighted estimations since
many country-sector observations are by their nature very small (e.g., Austria￿ s energy sector).
Measurement error is generally less for larger countries and sectors. However, we avoid weighting
21We do not emphasize log investment values due to data construction issues and imputed values. If we
exclude observations with missing deal values, our sample diminishes to 581 country-sector-period observations.
This smaller sample yields directionally similar results that are statistically signi￿cant when using base policies
and insigni￿cant when using transformed policies. For example, the cross-sectional coe¢ cients akin to Column
3￿ s Panel B of Table 5 are 0.095 (0.082) and -0.035 (0.065). The triple-di⁄erence results similar to Column 3￿ s
Panel B of Table 7 are 0.097 (0.079) and -0.090 (0.249).
22We focus on Table 6￿ s speci￿cation as it conveys the most information since it retains the main policies.
The interaction e⁄ects documented in these robustness checks are quite similar if instead using Table 7￿ s triple-
di⁄erenced framework.
23by realized country-sector size since this is endogenous to the studied mechanisms. The inter-
action focuses attention on better measured outcomes without encountering this latter concern.
Column 2 excludes sample weights and ￿nds qualitatively similar results. Coe¢ cient patterns
are very similar. The main e⁄ect for the Mechanism Index is statistically signi￿cant in the entry
estimation, while the interaction e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant in the count regression.
Columns 3 and 4 test excluding certain economies or sectors. The most sensitive part of our
estimations is the inclusion of the Anglo-Saxon economies, shown in Column 3. The entry margin
remains secure overall: the main e⁄ect becomes more powerful, while the interaction e⁄ect grows
slightly in economic magnitude but becomes imprecisely estimated due to the reduced variation.
For the count speci￿cation in Panel B, the main e⁄ect again remains of similar magnitude but
loses its statistical signi￿cance. The more disappointing aspect is that the interaction e⁄ect
in Panel B loses all power. We further comment on this Anglo-Saxon sensitivity below in
the Discussion section. By contrast, Column 4 shows very similar results when excluding the
computer sector. In general, the results are quite robust to sector adjustments or to country
adjustments beyond the highlighted Anglo-Saxon sensitivity.
Column 5 considers EVCA data that combine VC and buy-out placement. The sample covers
1990-2007 but is smaller than our main sample as the EVCA sector changes implemented in 2004
restrict us to nine sectors. We ￿nd support for our main e⁄ect in the EVCA data but not for the
interaction e⁄ect. Similar to the analysis that drops the Anglo-Saxon economies, the two data
sources show strong similarity in the cross-section placements at the country and sector levels,
and they have comparable main e⁄ects in panel estimations. Di⁄erences emerge when looking
at longitudinal changes at the country-sector interaction (the triple di⁄erence).23
23An initial investigation of buy-out investors is available upon request. Portfolio companies tend to be in
24Column 6 considers modi￿cations to our index design. Our goal is to provide joint policy
tests that are easy to implement with readily available data so that they are useful to practi-
tioners. The linear di⁄erence reported in Panel A of Tables 5-7 is important in this context,
as it is straightforward to recalculate ￿LME ￿ ￿EPR ￿ (￿LME=￿EPR) with other policy weights
￿LME;￿EPR. Our Mechanism and Levels Indices are also intended to be simple. One technical
issue with our approach is that we transform the two base policies to have unit standard devia-
tion before combining. Transformations of categorical variables like the employment protection
index can be problematic due to scale de￿nitions. While acknowledging this issue, we are com-
fortable with our approach as the OECD index is granular (e.g., it has values similar to ￿2.12￿
on its ￿ve-point scale that are well distributed with a density maximum of 6.7% of any single
value). Column 6 shows similar results without the standard deviation transformation in the
index design (coe¢ cient magnitudes are not directly comparable)
We obtain very similar results when normalizing labor market expenditures by country pop-
ulation instead of GDP. This comparability suggests that country wealth or wages levels are not
determining the patterns observed. We likewise obtain very similar results when normalizing
labor market expenditures by country unemployment levels. This stability further con￿rms that
our results are not being driven by cyclical features of automatic stabilizers like unemployment
insurance bene￿ts. We likewise ￿nd close results with many other construction details.24
less-volatile industries but to be more volatile than their peers. A correlation exists between cross-sectional
placements and labor policies, but we do not discern a longitudinal link similar to that evident for VC investors.
24We also ￿nd similar outcomes when replacing the Mechanism Index, which employs a bounded radian measure
of policy ratios, with a simple ratio of policy distances. The radian measure is a simple monotonic transformation
(inverse tangent) of the base distance ratio that is bounded by [0;￿=2] and eliminates asymmetry. Likewise, we
￿nd similar results when estimating the overall labor market insurance level through Euclidean distances rather
than linear distances. A second variant uses empirical results from Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) to weight the
Levels Index by how much employment protection and labor market expenditures boost workers￿perceptions of
security. The greater importance of policy mechanisms persists with these index variants.
25European countries trade extensively, and labor market insurance policies can create Ricar-
dian comparative advantages. Indeed, theory models often use this construct for identifying why
labor policies should matter for industry di⁄erences across countries. Ricardian trade theory in a
multi-country setting replicates the cross-sectional predictions of our simple model, but localized
comparative statics are not generally de￿ned (e.g., Costinot et al. 2011). Related to this, despite
the longitudinal changes we exploit, the rank orders of countries in terms of policies are very
persistent. In such settings, interaction e⁄ects may not capture well the localized shifts in sector
specialization. To con￿rm that our results are robust to estimation choice, we also analyzed
the aggregate volatility embodied in VC investments by country-period weighting across sectors.
This approach mirrors our panel estimation results.
Beyond these tests of estimation design, Table 9 considers a second set of robustness checks
where we consider other policies beyond labor market insurance mechanisms. We have de-
emphasized these alternative factors until now because we instead sought to design the empirical
framework in such a way as to naturally focus on labor issues only (e.g., the interactions with
volatility indices). In Table 9, we consider several policy alternatives, in each case entering
the base metric in the regression and an interaction of it with labor volatility. Columns 1 and
2 consider public R&D investments as a share of GDP and the country￿ s corporate tax rate
(e.g., Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2003). Public R&D investments are associated with higher VC
investments, with extra tilt towards more volatile sectors, while a systematic relationship with
corporate tax rates is not evident. These controls do not materially in￿ uence our results.
Armour and Cumming (2006, 2008) and Cumming (2012) identify the importance of bank-
ruptcy law to entrepreneurship. Bankruptcy law and employment protections both have conse-
quences for the speed and form that entrepreneurial adjustments can take and, in that sense,
26are quite related. Bankruptcy law strongly governs how quickly entrepreneurs can move from
a failed idea to a new venture. Employment law shapes how quickly entrepreneurs can adjust
￿rm size in response to changes in market conditions, technological updates, and similar news.
These policies are connected since once the appropriate employment adjustment is to close the
￿rm, bankruptcy provisions become central if the business is insolvent. Fear of bankruptcy
may also impact the types of businesses pursued and risks undertaken, similar to how potential
employment regulation costs shape the actions and choices of ￿rms.
Using metrics from Cumming (2012), we consider in Columns 3 and 4 the importance of
bankruptcy provisions and minimum capital requirements for ￿rms. These measures are not
available for all of the countries in our sample, and so the sample size declines somewhat. In
our data, bankruptcy provisions are very important, regardless of which metric from Cumming
(2012) we take, with more stringent bankruptcy laws reducing entrepreneurship with a magnitude
comparable to the main e⁄ect that we estimate for the Mechanism Index. We do not observe,
however, a systematic link to sector volatility. Inclusion of these controls does not in￿ uence our
coe¢ cient estimates much.
Column 5 considers public venturing￿ s role (e.g., Leleux and Surlemont 2003). Our EVCA
data separate at the country level investments that are made by public sources versus private
investors. We introduce in Column 5 a control for the share of total private equity funds in the
country coming from public sources along with its interaction with the volatility index. This
does not in￿ uence our results, and we also ￿nd similar robustness to alternative techniques like
entering public sector investments per capita. Our results are also robust to controlling for total
government expenditures per capita, the level of captive investments for private equity, and
aggregate private equity growth rates by sector.
27Column 6 considers a broader control based upon the legal origins of countries (e.g., La Porta
et al. 1997). Legal origins have been shown to in￿ uence many policy choices that countries make,
including labor laws, and so we include in our regressions a linear time trend interacted with
indicator variables for the four main legal origin groups. The results are very similar with this
control. If including origin-year ￿xed e⁄ects, our results look quite similar to those in Table 7
that include country-year ￿xed e⁄ects. That is, we no longer estimate a strong main e⁄ect, but
we ￿nd the di⁄erences across sectors to be quite strong.
Beyond these robustness checks, we conducted additional analyses at the cross-sectional level
in cases where we could not construct a longitudinal control. These include the strength of stock
markets, business entry regulation barriers, product market regulations, collective bargaining
arrangements or trade union density, government ownership of banks, the concentration of the
banking sector, and similar. These tests, along with the tight link of our labor policies to the
labor volatilities of sectors, provide a measure of assurance that our work is not simply picking
up unmodeled policy factors.
Finally, we close this empirical section with estimates in Table 10 of the relative magnitudes
of the main e⁄ects for policies. This paper generally seeks to establish and characterize the role
of labor market policies using econometric techniques like the di⁄erenced Rajan and Zingales
(1998) methodology. This technique helps isolate the role of labor market policies from other
country traits and policies. This technique, however, does not provide estimates of the relative
importance of labor policies compared to other factors. Nor does its sector-level characterization
easily extend to such cross-policy comparisons without developing extensive additional traits of
other sectors (e.g., the inherent likelihood of a company going bankrupt or paying corporate
taxes).
28To provide a sense of these relative policy magnitudes, we consider in Table 10 a joint es-
timation of the main e⁄ects developed in Table 9￿ s robustness analysis. This panel estimation
continues to include country-sector and sector-period ￿xed e⁄ects. Explanatory variables are
transformed to have unit standard deviation to facilitate comparison. We also report the es-
timates for the controls variables that have been included throughout this study. Column 1
considers the extensive margin of entry of VC investment, while Column 2 considers the log
count of investments.
The table provides several basic themes about the comparative sizes of these e⁄ects. First, the
bottom of the table shows that country GDP is easily the strongest predictor of investments, often
an order of magnitude greater than the policy choices. This is not surprising and provides a good
baseline for comparison. Second, in accordance with the earlier results, shifts in the Mechanism
Index towards more ￿ exible policies are associated with higher investment levels with elasticities
around 0.15. In the presence of these covariates, the Levels Index is associated with a stronger
reduction in investments with elasticities of 0.25-0.35. This latter result suggests declines in
worker insurance boost investment levels, although we continue to view the Mechanism Index
as the more policy relevant parameter.
In terms of magnitudes, these labor policies have predictive strength comparable to or greater
than the other policies modeled on the extensive margin. The most consistent detractor from
investment levels is stringent bankruptcy provisions, with a magnitude two-thirds of the size of
the Mechanism Index. Increases in corporate tax rates correlate with higher investments. On
the intensive margin, the labor policy magnitudes are quite comparable to the other policies
and public venturing. These results suggest that labor policies play an important role worthy of
careful policy attention, and that their connection to investment levels is on par with bankruptcy
29provisions, for example, or the boost associated with past IPO success for ventures in a country-
sector. It is important to emphasize that this comparability is calculated holding ￿xed the
overall level of worker insurance provided￿ it comes solely through careful policy design, and
countries willing to adjust overall worker insurance levels may harness additional gains. This
comparability is also robust to including time trends for the legal origins of countries, considering
log investment amounts, and similar variants.
Discussion
Looking across Tables 5-10, we conclude that labor market insurance policies have an important
link to the formation of VC investment. We acknowledge, however, that this analysis has limita-
tions, and we discuss here four important ones. First, despite Table 9 and related tests, omitted
factors may bias our estimates. In our defense, our results are strongly bolstered by evidence of
the same pattern with techniques ranging from cross-sectional work like Figure 1 and Table 2 to
estimates that employ the triple-di⁄erence strategy of Table 7. Alternative factors would also
have to operate at the country-sector level, have a tight link to sector volatility, and be able to
replicate these multiple levels of outcomes. We have yet to identify such a factor that our results
are not robust to, but one may exist that we have not identi￿ed.
Related, we remain cautious about reverse causality as we do not have exogenous policy
shocks. So, it is possible that the disproportionate development of VC in volatile sectors for a
country prompts the adjustment of labor policies to accommodate these investors. This does
not seem likely given the broader political economy of employment protection laws, especially
given the smaller sizes of the most impacted sectors. But, this response might be possible given
policy makers￿desire to promote VC investment. On the other hand, one could view the entry
30and development of European VC from 1990 onwards as a large location choice exercise. From
this perspective, one can predict remarkably well the sector-level sorting that will occur from
initial labor market policies that existed well before encouraging VC became an objective.
Beyond these ￿rst two issues, we earlier noted that our results are sensitive to the inclusion
of the Anglo-Saxon economies, and it is useful to summarize what we observe. First, this
paper has sought to establish the labor market linkage to VC investments at many levels, from
cross-sectional analyses to triple-di⁄erenced approaches. Cross-sectional analyses, like the Rajan
and Zingales (1998) methodology, and panel estimations of main e⁄ects are generally robust to
whether or not the Anglo-Saxon economies are included. In most cases, coe¢ cient estimates are
of similar economic magnitude when excluding the Anglo-Saxon economies, with some decline
in statistical precision from the reduced sample size and variation. However, one would rarely,
if ever, reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients are equal to those in the full sample, and
the conclusions from these analyses would be the same. On the other hand, the key limitation
is that noted in Table 8. Our triple-di⁄erenced results on the intensive margin of investment
counts depend upon including the Anglo-Saxon economies. This is disappointing as the triple-
di⁄erenced variation is the most secure from alternative explanations. It is worth noting that
this sensitivity is not because the Anglo-Saxon economies are on a di⁄erent long-run trend from
the rest of the sample, as we ￿nd very strong results when including time trends for the legal
origins of countries in Table 9 (which e⁄ectively adds a time trend for Anglo-Saxon economies).
Instead, triple-di⁄erencing requires a lot of variation to be successful, and excluding the Anglo-
Saxon economies substantially lowers the variation we can exploit. We ￿ ag this issue for future
researchers to evaluate in their own studies.
Finally, our VC investments results should not be used to argue that innovation itself must
31rise. Unreported estimations examine patent counts as the dependent variable. The estimations
￿nd a positive and signi￿cant longitudinal correlation of the Mechanism Index for patents at the
country level, but not the sector-level di⁄erentiation that we emphasize. This limited response
may question the causal link of VC to innovation (e.g., Ueda and Hirukawa 2008a,b) or may
indicate substitution by private or public entities. Given di⁄erences in Europe￿ s innovation
structure (e.g., Belenzon and Berkovitz 2010), this is particularly important for future research.
6. Conclusions
While many European business leaders and policy makers seek to foster VC investments into their
economies, the most productive path towards this goal remains uncertain. This paper quanti￿es
a key determinant of these patterns in labor market policies that are discussed less frequently
than R&D subsidies or public venturing. European economies empirically substitute between
employment protection and labor market expenditures to provide worker security. Employment
protection more directly taxes labor force adjustments, and VC investors are especially sensitive
to this choice given the sectors in which they operate and their business models. This factor
can explain some of the substantial heterogeneity across Europe in the volume, traits, and
importance of VC investments. Continued integration of Europe, encouraging ever stronger
cross-border investment ￿ ows and location choice options, may further accentuate these e⁄ects.
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36Notes: Figure 1a illustrates the policy trade-offs between employment protection and labor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance benefits) as a 
share of GDP.  Policies are averages over the 1990-2008 period.  European nations generally provision greater worker insurance than Anglo-Saxon economies 
on both policy dimensions (e.g., Germany and France versus the US and UK).  The solid trend line describes the policy trade-off for Continental European 
nations; the dashed line excludes Switzerland, which has insurance policies more similar to the Anglo-Saxon economies.  European nations that favor 
employment protection systematically have lower labor market expenditures.  Figure 1b shows transformations of these policies into the Levels Index and 
Mechanism Index that are used in empirical analyses.  Figures 1c and 1d plot these base policies against estimated VC investments as a share of GDP for the 
1990-2008 period.  European nations favoring labor market expenditures over employment protection display stronger VC investment levels. Employment Labor market Levels Mechanism Venture Venture US labor
protection expenditures index of  index of  capital capital volatility
index share of GDP insurance insurance deals deals in sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2)
Austria 2.1 1.9 2.8 0.8 330 Computers 4326 0.52
Belgium 2.5 3.6 3.8 0.9 520 Communications 3990 0.34
Denmark 1.7 4.8 3.7 1.2 782 Biotechnology 1969 0.43
Finland 2.1 3.7 3.4 1.0 1334 Medical and health 1959 0.35
France 3.0 2.6 3.7 0.7 3368 Consumer related 1942 0.41
Germany 2.5 3.1 3.6 0.9 2381 Other electronics 1401 0.36
Ireland 1.0 2.6 2.5 1.2 634 Other services 917 0.41
Italy 2.7 1.2 2.8 0.6 424 Industrial products 678 0.31
Netherlands 2.4 3.6 3.6 0.9 995 Other manufacturing 488 0.37
Norway 2.7 1.7 3.0 0.6 441 Financial services 450 0.40
Portugal 3.7 1.5 3.8 0.5 320 Transportation 410 0.35
Spain 3.1 2.7 3.8 0.7 678 Energy 365 0.49
Sweden 2.5 3.5 3.6 0.9 1625 Chemicals and materials 318 0.28
Switzerland 1.1 1.4 1.8 0.9 502 Industrial automation 307 0.33
UK 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8 5186
Table 1A:  Country-level descriptive statistics for European sample Table 1B:  Sector-level descriptive statistics
Notes:  Columns 1-4 provide average values over the 1990-2008 period. The employment 
protection regulations index is taken from the OECD and has a theoretical range of zero to five, 
with higher scores indicating stronger employment protection.  Labor market expenditures as a 
share of GDP is derived from the OECD Social Expenditures and Labour Force databases.  The 
Levels Index and Mechanism Index of labor market insurance are transformations of the 
employment protection and labor market expenditures policies.  The Levels Index estimates the 
joint insurance provided through these two policies; higher values indicate greater worker 
insurance provision.  The Mechanism Index estimates the relative importance of the two policies; 
higher values indicate greater reliance on labor market expenditures versus employment protection 
in the provision.  VC deal counts are taken from the Venture Xpert database for the 1990-2008 
period.  Appendix Tables 1-3 provide additional details.
Notes:  VC deal counts are taken from the Venture Xpert 
database for the 1990-2008 period.  US labor volatility 
metrics are calculated for establishments from the US Census 
Bureau data for 1977-1999.  Volatility is defined as the mean 
absolute change in establishment employment from the 
previous year divided by the average employment in the 
current and previous years.  Additional details on data 
sources and metric construction are available upon request 
from the authors.Share of VC investments over the Full sample
1990-2008 period for each European distribution Countries Countries Difference  Countries Countries Difference 
country grouped by the sector's labor favoring favoring between providing  providing  between
labor volatility in the United States employment labor market column 3 lower labor  higher labor  column 6
protection expenditures and column 2 insurance insurance and column 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sectors in top third of volatility 0.382 0.353 0.415 0.062 0.384 0.379 -0.004
(0.021) (0.033) (0.019) (0.038) (0.028) (0.033) (0.043)
Sectors in middle third of volatility 0.253 0.290 0.211 -0.079 0.231 0.277 0.046
(0.023) (0.037) (0.016) (0.040) (0.024) (0.041) (0.048)
Sectors in bottom third of volatility 0.365 0.357 0.374 0.017 0.385 0.343 -0.042
(0.012) (0.020) (0.014) (0.025) (0.019) (0.012) (0.022)
Table 2: Tabulations by investments shares by base country policy groups
Notes:  Tabulations describe the distribution of investments made by countries across sectors of various volatilities during the 1990-2008 period.  Countries are split 
based upon their average policy positions during the period using the median values observed across all countries.  The split in Columns 2-4 uses the Mechanism Index 
of labor insurance.  Countries in Column 2 favor employment protection relatively more, given their overall level of insurance provided, and include AUT, ESP, FRA, 
GBR, ITA, NOR, PRT, and SWE.  Countries in Column 3 favor labor market expenditures relatively more, given their overall level of insurance provided, and include 
BEL, CHE, DEU, DNK, FIN, IRE, and NLD.  Column 4 provides the linear difference between these two groups that allows for unequal variance.  The split in 
Columns 5-7 uses the Levels Index of labor insurance.  Countries in Column 5 provide generally lower labor market insurance, considering both policies together, and 
include AUT, CHE, FIN, GBR, IRE, ITA, NOR, and SWE.  Countries in Column 6 provide higher insurance levels and include BEL, DEU, DNK, ESP, FRA, NLD, 
and PRT.  Column 7 provides the linear difference between these two groups that allows for unequal variance.  Sectors are split by labor volatility as observed in the 
United States across the 1977-1999 period.  High-volatility sectors include Biotechnology, Computers, Energy, and Other services.  Medium-volatility sectors include 
Consumer related, Financial services, Other electronics, Other manufacturing, and Transportation.  Low-volatility sectors include Chemicals and materials, 
Communications, Industrial automation, Industrial products, and Medical and health.  Tables 1A and 1B provide underlying values.
Countries split by insurance mechanisms Countries split by insurance levels(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indicator variable for VC 0.292 0.226 0.245 0.170 0.209 0.231
investment in the firm (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Sample employed Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Matched
Country-industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size and revenue covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,350,850 2,350,850 2,350,850 102,144 102,144 9,659
Employ- Revenues Assets per Firm Wage EBITDA
ment employee age margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm trait indicated in column headers 0.096 -0.078 0.053 -0.029 0.025 -0.017
(0.031) (0.032) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Indicated firm trait 0.008 -0.011 0.009 -0.003 0.005 -0.001
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Indicated firm trait -0.021 0.033 -0.004 0.007 -0.010 0.004
x nation's employment protection index (0.020) (0.021) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Indicated firm trait -0.018 0.013 -0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.004
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
x nation's employment protection index
Notes:  Coefficients are from a single regression of VC investment in Europe for 1999-2008 using the Amadeus database.  The 
dependent variable is an indicator variable for VC investments in firms transformed to have unit standard deviation for interpretation.  
Explanatory variables are indicated firm traits (noted by column sub-headers) and their interactions with sector volatilities and OECD 
employment protection indices for countries.  Variables are demeaned and transformed to have unit standard deviation before 
interaction.  Firm traits are winsorized at their 2%/98% values by country-industry-year.  The regression includes country-industry-year 
fixed effects, clusters standard errors by country, and contains 2,053,302 observations where all firm traits are recorded.  Industries are 
defined at the three-digit level of the Standard Industrial Classification system.  Country-industry-year fixed effects absorb policy and 
sector volatility main effects.
Coefficients are from a single regression that includes each variable
indicated by column headers interacted as described in the rows
Table 3: Labor volatility of VC-backed companies in Europe
Dependent variable is labor volatility of firm in unit standard deviations
Notes:  Firm-year estimations consider labor volatility among VC investments in Europe for 1999-2008 using the Amadeus database.  
Dependent variables are the absolute values of employment changes by firm from the prior year relative to the average employment level 
of the firm in the current and previous years.  These volatility measures are transformed to have unit standard deviation for 
interpretation.  The explanatory variable is an indicator variable for the firm being backed by VC investors.  Regressions include country-
industry-year fixed effects (where indicated) and cluster standard errors by country.  Industries are defined at the three-digit level of the 
Standard Industrial Classification system.  Firm size and revenues covariates include log employment and log revenues of firms.  The 
restricted sample in Columns 4-5 only includes country-industry pairs where VC ownership is identified in greater than 1% of the firms.  
The matched sample in Column 6 creates a control group that most closely matches the employment and revenues of VC portfolio firms 
in the same country-industry-year as the VC investments.
Table 4: Selection and traits of VC-backed companies in Europe
Dep. variable is indicator for VC investments in unit standard deviationsExtensive Log count Log value Extensive Log count Log value
margin  of VC of VC margin  of VC of VC
investments investments investments investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OECD employment protection index -0.034 -0.127 -0.143 -0.028 -0.098 -0.111
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.012) (0.057) (0.083) (0.012) (0.056) (0.082)
Labor market expenditures 0.021 0.073 0.088 0.019 0.064 0.075
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.017) (0.039) (0.062) (0.017) (0.050) (0.072)
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 840 671 671 840 671 671
Linear combination for policy mechanism: 0.054 0.200 0.231 0.047 0.162 0.186
β[Labor market exp.] - β[Employment protection] (0.027) (0.079) (0.126) (0.027) (0.093) (0.139)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.033 0.099 0.116 0.028 0.083 0.095
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.009) (0.034) (0.050) (0.009) (0.038) (0.054)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.009 -0.043 -0.044 -0.006 -0.029 -0.030
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.008) (0.040) (0.054) (0.008) (0.036) (0.049)
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 840 671 671 840 671 671
Table 5: Cross-sectional estimations of European VC investments and labor market policies
Dependent variable is VC investment in the country-sector-period
A. Estimations using base policies
B. Estimations using transformed policies
Notes:  Estimations consider VC investments in Europe for 1990-2008 by country-sector-period.  The four time periods are 1990-1994, 
1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2008.  The dependent variables are an indicator variable for one or more VC investments on average 
per annum in the country-sector during the period, the log count of VC investments, and the estimated log value of VC investments.  
Panel A presents estimations that employ base employment protection and labor market insurance expenditure variables.  These country-
period explanatory variables are interacted with the time-invariant sector-level labor volatility of establishments in the US measured 1977-
1999.  The bottom row presents the linear difference β[Labor market exp.] - β[Employment protection] and its standard error for the 
interaction with sector labor volatility.  This difference approximates a policy change that holds the level of worker insurance provided 
constant but adjusts the insurance mechanism from employment protection towards labor market expenditures.  Panel B presents 
estimations that employ transformed policy metrics.  The Mechanism Index of labor market insurance measures the extent to which a 
nation's policies favor labor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance benefits) over employment protection as the mechanism 
for providing worker insurance in the economy.  The Levels Index measures the total insurance provided by these two policies.  Main 
effects are demeaned prior to interactions and are absorbed by fixed effects.  Variables are transformed to have unit standard deviation for 
interpretation.  Regressions are weighted by country populations interacted with aggregate sector size.  Columns 1-3 present estimations 
without country-sector covariates; columns 4-6 include these covariates. Additional covariates include log patents in the country-sector-
period, the lagged IPO share in country-sector-period, seed and early stage investment shares in country-sector-period, and log estimates 
of country-sector size and wage developed from Amadeus for 1999-2008.  Standard errors are clustered by country.Extensive Log count Log value Extensive Log count Log value
margin  of VC of VC margin  of VC of VC
investments investments investments investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OECD employment protection index -0.320 -0.330 -0.121 -0.284 -0.282 -0.085
(0.107) (0.190) (0.217) (0.097) (0.186) (0.209)
OECD employment protection index -0.111 -0.089 -0.067 -0.110 -0.109 -0.086
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.051) (0.061) (0.050) (0.048) (0.065) (0.051)
Labor market expenditures 0.137 0.018 0.015 0.121 0.009 0.011
(0.058) (0.111) (0.158) (0.049) (0.104) (0.143)
Labor market expenditures 0.037 0.085 0.164 0.028 0.074 0.155
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.059) (0.105) (0.130) (0.059) (0.110) (0.130)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log country GDP control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 840 671 671 840 671 671
Linear combination for policy mechanism: 0.148 0.174 0.231 0.137 0.184 0.241
β[Labor market exp.] - β[Employment protection] (0.059) (0.107) (0.112) (0.051) (0.098) (0.105)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.154 0.134 0.097 0.135 0.118 0.091
(0.022) (0.053) (0.070) (0.020) (0.054) (0.069)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.048 0.059 0.073 0.044 0.063 0.076
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.159 -0.185 0.011 -0.139 -0.173 0.013
(0.133) (0.194) (0.187) (0.116) (0.179) (0.169)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.044 -0.007 0.032 -0.052 -0.027 0.016
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.070) (0.080) (0.114) (0.074) (0.094) (0.116)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log country GDP control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 840 671 671 840 671 671
Table 6: Longitudinal estimations of European VC investments and labor market policies
Dependent variable is VC investment in the country-sector-period
A. Estimations using base policies
B. Estimations using transformed policies
Notes:  See Table 5. Estimates include country-sector and  sector-period fixed effects to consider longitudinal changes within country-
sectors. These estimations identify longitudinal responses at the country level and the differentials that exist by time-invariant US sector 
volatility.Extensive Log count Log value Extensive Log count Log value
margin  of VC of VC margin  of VC of VC
investments investments investments investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OECD employment protection index -0.111 -0.093 -0.077 -0.110 -0.103 -0.084
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.052) (0.087) (0.090) (0.048) (0.077) (0.075)
Labor market expenditures 0.037 0.117 0.207 0.027 0.105 0.195
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.061) (0.119) (0.142) (0.061) (0.121) (0.142)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 840 671 671 840 671 671
Linear combination for policy mechanism: 0.148 0.210 0.283 0.136 0.208 0.279
β[Labor market exp.] - β[Employment protection] (0.061) (0.131) (0.142) (0.054) (0.119) (0.134)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.048 0.072 0.091 0.043 0.071 0.088
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.044 0.021 0.072 -0.051 0.005 0.060
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.073) (0.110) (0.135) (0.075) (0.112) (0.134)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 840 671 671 840 671 671
Table 7: Triple-differenced estimations of European VC investments and labor market policies
Dependent variable is VC investment in the country-sector-period
A. Estimations using base policies
B. Estimations using transformed policies
Notes:  See Table 5. Estimates include country-sector fixed effects, sector-period fixed effects, and country-period fixed effects in a triple-
differencing approach. Estimations require that a within-country shift in worker insurance policies towards more flexible techniques 
connect with an increase in VC financing (the first differencing due to country-sector fixed effects, a longitudinal response) that exceeds 
the overall sector growth worldwide (the second differencing due to sector-year fixed effects) and that is strongest in sectors with greater 
intrinsic labor volatility (the third differencing due to country-year fixed effects). Sector volatility is time-invariant and measured using 
US data, so that changes are only being identified through policies.Using Excluding  Excluding Excluding Examining Examining
US sector sample UK and  computer EVCA linear
volatility weights Ireland sector totals indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.136 0.084 0.240 0.135 0.030 0.116
(0.020) (0.028) (0.092) (0.021) (0.011) (0.020)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.025 0.020 0.054 0.048 -0.004 0.034
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.011) (0.021) (0.045) (0.026) (0.007) (0.013)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.141 -0.099 -0.164 -0.126 -0.002 -0.157
(0.118) (0.080) (0.090) (0.127) (0.062) (0.111)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.044 -0.027 -0.080 -0.017 0.018 -0.069
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.049) (0.044) (0.069) (0.127) (0.037) (0.059)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log country GDP control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 840 840 728 780 540 840
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.121 0.033 0.139 0.123 0.146 0.096
(0.055) (0.079) (0.188) (0.067) (0.054) (0.044)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.043 0.043 -0.032 0.086 0.007 0.057
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.020) (0.027) (0.124) (0.057) (0.012) (0.021)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.173 -0.262 -0.232 -0.221 -0.024 -0.176
(0.181) (0.252) (0.171) (0.239) (0.310) (0.179)
Levels index of labor market insurance 0.026 -0.048 -0.131 -0.147 -0.028 -0.041
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.080) (0.114) (0.121) (0.296) (0.065) (0.069)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log country GDP control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 671 671 576 616 530 671
Table 8: Robustness checks on longitudinal results
Dependent variable is VC investment in the country-sector-period
A.  Entry specification in Column 1 of Panel B of Table 6
B.  Count specification in Column 2 of Panel B of Table 6
Notes:  See Table 6. Panel A shows robustness checks on the entry specification from Column 1 of Panel B of Table 6. Panel B shows 
robustness checks on the count specification from Column 2 of Panel B of Table 6.Including Including Including Including Including Including
public corporate bankruptcy required public  time trends
R&D share tax rates discharge minimum venturing for legal
of GDP stringency capital shares origins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.124 0.143 0.124 0.129 0.137 0.125
(0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.035)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.043 0.046 0.044
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.119 -0.169 -0.137 -0.102 -0.148 -0.143
(0.086) (0.102) (0.099) (0.110) (0.123) (0.115)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.040 -0.032 -0.053 -0.055 -0.065 -0.052
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.074) (0.081) (0.073) (0.091) (0.072) (0.074)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log country GDP control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 840 840 672 672 840 840
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.106 0.131 0.108 0.115 0.130 0.126
(0.057) (0.047) (0.052) (0.054) (0.061) (0.099)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.056 0.068 0.065 0.061 0.068 0.064
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.014) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.148 -0.230 -0.131 -0.083 -0.224 -0.111
(0.167) (0.209) (0.132) (0.158) (0.170) (0.119)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.008 -0.049 -0.046 -0.069 -0.038 -0.028
x time-invariant US labor volatility by sector (0.106) (0.141) (0.101) (0.107) (0.114) (0.093)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log country GDP control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 671 671 555 555 671 671
Table 9: Robustness checks on longitudinal results, continued
Dependent variable is VC investment in the country-sector-period
A.  Entry specification in Column 1 of Panel B of Table 6
B.  Count specification in Column 2 of Panel B of Table 6
Notes:  See Table 6. Panel A shows robustness checks on the entry specification from Column 1 of Panel B of Table 6. Panel B shows 
robustness checks on the count specification from Column 2 of Panel B of Table 6.Extensive margin Log count of investments
(1) (2)
Mechanism index of labor market insurance 0.151 0.167
(0.019) (0.035)
Levels index of labor market insurance -0.249 -0.355
(0.106) (0.100)
Public R&D share of GDP 0.104 0.059
(0.082) (0.163)
Corporate tax rate 0.156 0.279
(0.045) (0.087)
Stringency of bankruptcy discharge laws -0.096 -0.166
(0.046) (0.061)
Minimum capital requirement laws 0.122 0.332
(0.146) (0.239)
Public venturing share of investments 0.070 0.202
(0.061) (0.088)
Log patent counts -0.010 -0.089
(0.060) (0.097)
Lagged past IPO success of ventures 0.176 0.242
(0.080) (0.224)
Seed stage share of investments 0.238 0.790
(0.204) (0.335)
Early stage share of investments 0.270 -0.249
(0.173) (0.422)
Log country GDP 0.900 2.029
(0.204) (0.719)
Country-sector fixed effects Yes Yes
Sector-period fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 672 555
Table 10: Comparison of main effects for policies
DV is VC investment in the country-sector-period
Notes:  See Tables 6 and 9.  Estimations consider VC investments in Europe for 1990-2008 by country-sector-period.  The 
four time periods are 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2008.  The dependent variable in Column 1 is an 
indicator variable for one or more VC investments on average per annum in the country-sector during the period. The 
dependent variable in Column 2 is the log count of VC investments.  The Mechanism Index of labor market insurance 
measures the extent to which a nation's policies favor labor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance benefits) 
over employment protection as the mechanism for providing worker insurance in the economy.  The Levels Index 
measures the total insurance provided by these two policies.  Variables are transformed to have unit standard deviation for 
interpretation.  Regressions are weighted by country populations interacted with aggregate sector size.  Standard errors are 
clustered by country.1990-4 1995-9 2000-4 2005-8 1990-4 1995-9 2000-4 2005-8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Austria 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.0
Belgium 3.2 2.6 2.2 2.2 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.4
Denmark 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 6.3 5.1 4.3 3.1
Finland 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 4.2 4.4 2.9 2.5
France 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.2
Germany 3.2 2.6 2.2 2.1 3.0 3.5 3.3 2.3
Ireland 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 3.9 3.0 1.6 1.6
Italy 3.6 3.2 2.0 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3
Netherlands 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.1 4.0 4.1 3.3 2.7
Norway 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.1
Portugal 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.4 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.8
Spain 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.7 2.4 2.2 2.3
Sweden 3.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 4.5 4.2 2.7 2.0
Switzerland 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.3
UK 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.5
1990-4 1995-9 2000-4 2005-8 1990-4 1995-9 2000-4 2005-8
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Austria 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
Belgium 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
Denmark 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2
Finland 3.6 3.9 3.2 3.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0
France 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7
Germany 3.8 3.9 3.4 3.2 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9
Ireland 3.0 2.9 1.9 2.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Italy 3.5 3.3 2.2 2.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8
Netherlands 3.8 4.1 3.4 3.3 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Norway 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5
Portugal 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6
Spain 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7
Sweden 4.2 3.9 3.2 3.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9
Switzerland 1.4 2.3 1.8 1.9 0.6 1.2 1.0 1.0
UK 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.1 0.4 0.5
Appendix Table 1:  Panel variation in labor market policies across European sample
Notes: See Table 1A.
Employment protection index Labor market expenditures share of GDP
Labor market insurance levels index Labor market insurance mechanism indexAppendix Table 2: EVCA sector definitions
Communications - Internet Technology: browsers, portals, search engines and other internet enabling technologies, website 
design and consultancy, ISPs.  Telecommunications (Hardware): voice and data communications equipment, 
cable/mobile/satellite network equipment excluding telecommunications carriers.  Telecommunications (Carriers): 
cable/mobile/satellite telecommunications carriers.  Communications (other): TV and radio broadcasting, media houses, 
publishing.
Computer Related - Computer (Hardware): computer mainframes, laptops, minicomputers, PDA/hand-held devices, optical 
scanning equipment, voice synthesis/recognition equipment.  Computer (Semiconductors): semiconductors, electronic 
components (e.g., integrated circuits, transistors), semiconductor fabrication equipment.  Computer (Services): data 
processing, hardware maintenance, IT consulting, IT training.  Computer (Software): application software products, 
operating systems and systems-related software for all types of hardware, systems integration, software development.  
Includes manufacturers, resellers, and distributors.
Other Electronics Related - batteries, power supplies, fibre optics, analytical and scientific instrumentation.
Biotechnology - agricultural/animal biotechnology (e.g., plant diagnostics), industrial biotechnology (e.g., derived 
chemicals), biotechnology related research and production equipment.
Medical/Health Related - Medical (Healthcare): health institutions, hospital management, handicap aids & basic healthcare 
supplies.  Medical (Instruments/Devices): technologically advanced diagnostic & therapeutic products and services.  Medical 
(Pharmaceuticals): drug development, manufacture and supply.
Energy - oil and gas exploration and production, exploration and drilling services and equipment, coal related, energy 
conservation related, alternative energy.
Consumer Related - Consumer (Retail): retailing of consumer products and services (including leisure and recreational 
products).  Consumer (Other): manufacture and supply of consumer products.
Industrial Products and Services - industrial equipment and machinery, pollution and recycling related, industrial services.
Chemicals and Materials - agricultural chemicals, commodity chemicals, specialty or performance chemicals/materials, 
coating and adhesives, membranes and membrane-based products.
Industrial Automation - industrial measurement and sensing equipment, process control equipment, robotics, machine vision 
systems, numeric and computerized control of machine tools.
Other Manufacturing - business products and supplies, office furniture, textiles, hardware and plumbing supplies, pulp and 
paper, printing and binding, packaging products and systems.
Transportation - airlines, railways, buses, airfield and other transportation services, mail and package shipment. 
Financial Services - banking, insurance related, real estate, securities and commodities brokers.
Other Services - engineering services, advertising and public relations, distributors, importers and wholesalers; consulting 
services (excluding IT consulting – see Computer: Services).
Agriculture - animal husbandry, crop cultivation, fishing, forestry.
Construction - construction services, manufacture of building materials, manufacture of pre-fabricated buildings and systems.
Other - mining, utilities, conglomerates.
Source:  Compiled from EVCA Private Equity Survey Guidance Notes and Glossary by EVCA (2005), Thomson Financial, 
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. We exclude the small EVCA sectors of Agriculture, Construction, and Other due to inability 
for calculating volatility.Computers Comm- Biotech- Medical and Consumer Other Other
unications nology health related electronics services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Austria 28% 11% 14% 7% 7% 10% 6%
Belgium 28% 17% 14% 8% 8% 6% 4%
Denmark 20% 15% 24% 18% 5% 7% 2%
Finland 24% 18% 7% 11% 8% 10% 2%
France 26% 22% 8% 7% 14% 7% 6%
Germany 21% 22% 18% 9% 6% 7% 2%
Ireland 36% 25% 5% 6% 4% 12% 3%
Italy 11% 19% 2% 6% 18% 4% 8%
Netherlands 17% 21% 7% 8% 13% 4% 8%
Norway 23% 20% 7% 8% 5% 4% 4%
Portugal 10% 6% 4% 11% 28% 4% 10%
Spain 12% 16% 5% 8% 20% 3% 8%
Sweden 18% 22% 13% 14% 5% 9% 3%
Switzerland 15% 18% 21% 17% 4% 13% 1%
UK 23% 21% 8% 12% 10% 7% 6%
Industrial Other Financial Transport- Energy Chemicals Industrial
products manufact. services ation & materials automation
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Austria 6% 3% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1%
Belgium 5% 3% 2% 3% 1% 3% 0%
Denmark 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2%
Finland 7% 3% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3%
France 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
Germany 3% 2% 1% 3% 2% 2% 2%
Ireland 1% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 3%
Italy 10% 7% 6% 4% 1% 4% 0%
Netherlands 4% 4% 4% 3% 2% 1% 2%
Norway 10% 1% 3% 2% 10% 0% 1%
Portugal 8% 4% 6% 4% 1% 4% 0%
Spain 5% 5% 3% 7% 3% 3% 1%
Sweden 4% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 4%
Switzerland 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3%
UK 2% 2% 4% 2% 3% 2% 1%
Appendix Table 3:  Sector composition by country of European VC sample
Notes: See Tables 1A and 1B. Table documents the share of VC investment counts by country over 1990-2008 period. 
Percentages for a country to sum 100% across the 14 columns.